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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE  
IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
 




This article examines the contemporary role of the International Court of Justice in 
the settlement of international investment disputes, specifically through the currently unused 
mechanism of Article 64 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States (hereafter, the “ICSID Convention”).  Part II (Court of 
Last Resort, but not Appeal:  the Article 64 Clause Compromissoire in the ICSID 
Convention) examines how Article 64 of the ICSID Convention operates as a clause 
compromissoire to invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court: “[a]ny dispute arising 
between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by 
the application of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another 
method of dispute settlement”.  Read in conjunction with Article 27(1) of the ICSID 
Convention (a provision that expressly prohibits States from diplomatically espousing claims 
that are already subject of a pending arbitration), Article 64 has been regarded as a post-
award inter-State enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with arbitral awards issued 
under the Convention.  On the basis of this conception, the Court has not yet received any 
referrals of international investment disputes since the passage of the ICSID Convention. 
  
 A fair reading of Article 64, however, should also take into consideration the Court’s 
own interpretation of similar clauses compromissoire throughout its jurisprudential history.  
As I show in Part III (The Court’s Judicial Function in Support of ICSID Arbitration), the 
Court has not hesitated to exercise its judicial function to independently and objectively 
determine the scope of its jurisdiction ratione materiae.  While the Report of the Executive 
Directors to the ICSID Convention specifically restrict the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction to 
matters that do not affect pending arbitrations, the Court may not necessarily find itself 
bound by this interpretation. I submit that Article 64’s scope of “disputes…concerning the 
interpretation or application” of a treaty could also support the Court’s jurisdiction ratione 
materiae over three issues central to the preservation of the parties’ exclusive choice of forum 
through the ICSID arbitral process:  first, the narrow theoretical possibility of seeking 
immediate provisional measures, in extreme situations, against a State’s injurious measures 
during the intervening period before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal; second, the 
possibility of seeking injunctive or declaratory relief from the Court against recalcitrant 
States that purposely attempt to thwart or prevent participation in the ICSID arbitration by 
interposing domestic court actions; and third, the possibility of seeking post-award 
conservatory measures to ensure a State’s recognition or execution of a Convention award.  
In these instances, the Court exercises jurisdiction to ensure States’ continued support of the 
arbitral process pursuant to their Convention obligations.  In the Conclusion, I observe that 
while the early jurisprudence of the Court provided for inter-State settlement of disputes 
arising from the espousal of claims by aggrieved investors, the advent of the ICSID 
Convention has not necessarily eliminated any meaningful role for the Court in international 
investment disputes.  Rather, it is a combination of both the prevailing conservatism of States 	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Parties towards the perceived limited uses of the Article 64 mechanism in the ICSID 
Convention, and States’ pragmatic attitudes concerning the strategic efficacy of the Court, 
that might provide a better explanation for why the Court has remained dormant and 
underutilized in the settlement of modern international investment disputes. 
 
 
I.  Introduction: The Court’s Role in Settling Investment 
Disputes 
The postwar dominance of the investment treaty arbitration system, especially 
under the auspices of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (otherwise known as the ICSID 
Convention), 2  plausibly explains why very few investment disputes have been 
referred to the International Court of Justice.3   The direct accessibility of the 
investment treaty arbitration system to foreign investors obviates the need for 
diplomatic espousal by the States of their nationality,4 rendering the Court’s direct 
inter-State adjudication unnecessary for the settlement of these types of disputes. 
To some extent, however, it may also be said that the Court itself minimized 
its utility as a forum for settlement of international investment disputes. Its 2007 
Decision on Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo)5 is a crystal example of 
how the Court closed the door on States seeking to exercise diplomatic protection on 
behalf of foreign investors that are minority shareholders.  To recall, in Diallo the 
Republic of Guinea sought to assert diplomatic protection on behalf of a Guinean 
national, Mr. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, who was a minority shareholder of a company 
registered in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC).  Guinea 
asserted that Mr. Diallo incurred injury arising from his arrest, deportation, and 
expulsion from the DRC for supposedly “hav[ing] breached public order in Zaire, 
especially in the economic, financial and monetary areas”.6   As a preliminary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
18 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.  [hereafter, “ICSID Convention”] 
3 See ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE AND LUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:  
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 35-39 (Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
4 Christoph Schreuer, The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System, in THE CONVENTION ON THE 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 15-30, 16 (R. 
Hofmann and C. Tams (Eds.), 2007). 
5 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, at 582. 
6 Id., at 591, para. 15. 
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objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, the DRC challenged the standing of the 
Republic of Guinea to exercise diplomatic protection over Mr. Diallo’s claims “since 
its Application seeks essentially to secure reparation for injury suffered on account of 
the alleged violation of rights of companies not possessing its nationality.”7   
To justify its claim to exercise diplomatic protection, Guinea argued that it 
was “taking up the cause of one of its nationals, and is acting to enforce his direct 
rights as an individual and as shareholder and executive officer of companies which 
he founded…and of which he is the sole or principal owner, to the exclusion of 
distinct rights which these companies may have against the DRC.”8  It sought to 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Mr. Diallo for the violation of “three 
categories of rights:  his individual personal rights, his direct rights as associé in 
Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire and the rights of those companies, by 
substitution.”9  As to the second and third categories of rights, Guinea clarified that it 
was confining itself to “the violation of the rights enjoyed by Mr. Diallo in respect of 
the companies, including his rights of supervision, control and management, and that 
it is therefore not confusing his rights with those of the company.”10  
Guinea relied heavily on the Court’s pronouncement in the Barcelona 
Traction case to support its theory of diplomatic protection “by substitution” of Mr. 
Diallo of the rights accruing to the said companies,: “an act directed against and 
infringing only the company’s rights does not involve responsibility towards the 
shareholders, even if their interests are affected…the situation is different if the act 
complained of is aimed at the direct rights of the shareholder as such.”11  In 
Barcelona Traction, a case it decided nearly forty years before Diallo, the Court noted 
general rule on diplomatic protection over companies (“where it is a question of an 
unlawful act committed against a company representing foreign capital, the general 
rule of international law authorizes the national State of the company alone to make a 
claim”12), but also issued its famous dictum which carved out a narrow exception to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Id., at 589, para. 11. 
8 Id., at 595, para. 29. 
9 Id., at 596, para. 31. 
10 Id., at 604, para. 55. 
11 Id., at 603, para. 54, citing Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1970, at 36, paras. 46-47. 
12 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, at 46, para. 
88. 
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this rule on the basis of equity. The Court acknowledged in Barcelona Traction that 
States of the nationality of foreign shareholders may have equitable bases to assert 
diplomatic protection, so long as they could show that the corporation was reduced to 
such a “position of impotence”13, to the point that the corporation could not have 
feasibly approached its national State for diplomatic protection.14 For nearly forty 
years since the Court issued that dictum in Barcelona Traction, the exception was 
maintained until the 2007 Diallo decision. 
In Diallo, the Court returned to the strict rule that only States of the nationality 
of the corporation could exercise diplomatic protection over the rights of the 
corporation. The Court lent short shrift to Guinea’s attempt to exercise diplomatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Id., at 50, para. 100. 
14 The Court found that the Belgian Government, as the State of the nationality of the foreign 
shareholders, did not meet this jus standi threshold.  Id., at 48-50, paras. 93-101: 
“93. …in the field of diplomatic protection as in all other fields of international law, it is necessary that 
the law be applied reasonably… 
94. In view, however, of the discretionary nature of diplomatic protection, considerations of equity 
cannot require more than the possibility for some protector State to intervene, whether it be the 
national State of the company, by virtue of the general rule mentioned above, or, in a secondary 
capacity, the national State of the shareholders who claim protection.  In this connection, account 
should also be taken of the practical effects of deducing from considerations of equity any broader 
right of protection for the national State of the shareholders… 
97. The situations in which foreign shareholders in a company wish to have recourse to diplomatic 
protection by their own national State may vary.  It may happen that the national State of the company 
simply refuses to grant it its diplomatic protection, or that it begins to exercise it (as in the present 
case) but does not pursue its action to the end.  It may also happen that the national State of the 
company and the State which has committed a violation of international law with regard to the 
company arrive at a settlement of the matter, by agreeing on compensation for the company, but that 
the foreign shareholders find the compensation insufficient.  Now, as a matter of principle, it would be 
difficult to draw a distinction between these three cases so far as the protection of foreign shareholders 
by their national State is concerned, since in each case they may have suffered real damage.  
Furthermore, the national State of the company is perfectly free to decide how far it is appropriate for 
it to protect the company, and is not bound to make public the reasons for its decision.  To reconcile 
this discretionary power of the company’s national State with a right of protection falling to the 
shareholders’ national State would be particularly difficult when the former State has concluded, with 
the State which has contravened international law with regard to the company, an agreement granting 
the company compensation which the foreign shareholders find inadequate.  If, after such a settlement, 
the national State of the foreign shareholders could in its turn put forward a claim based on the same 
facts, this would be likely to introduce into the negotiation of this kind of agreement a lack of security 
which would be contrary to the stability which it is the object of international law to establish in 
international relations… 
100.  In the present case, it is clear from what has been said above that Barcelona Traction was never 
reduced to a position of impotence such that it could not have approached its national State, Canada, to 
ask for its diplomatic protection, and that, as far as appeared to the Court, there is nothing to prevent 
Canada from continuing to grant its diplomatic protection to Barcelona Traction if it had considered 
that it should do so. 
101. For the above reasons, the Court is not of the opinion that, in the particular circumstances of the 
present case, jus standi is conferred on the Belgian Government by considerations of equity.” 
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protection according to the third category of rights allegedly pertaining to Mr. Diallo 
(e.g. rights of the companies, by substitution).  The Court particularly noted that the 
special treaty regimes governing investment protection did not create an exception in 
customary international law allowing for diplomatic protection of foreign 
shareholders by substitution: 
 
“89.  The Court, having carefully examined State practice and 
decisions of international courts and tribunals in respect of diplomatic 
protection of associés and shareholders, is of the opinion that these do not 
reveal – at least at the present time – an exception in customary 
international law allowing for protection by substitution, such as is relied 
on by Guinea. 
90.  The fact invoked by Guinea that various international 
agreements, such as agreements for the promotion and protection of 
foreign investments and the Washington Convention, have established 
special legal regimes governing investment protection, or that provisions 
in this regard are commonly included in contracts entered into directly 
between States and foreign investors, is not sufficient to show that there 
has been a change in the customary rules of diplomatic protection; it could 
equally show the contrary… 
94.  In view of the foregoing, the Court cannot accept Guinea’s 
claim to exercise diplomatic protection by substitution.  It is therefore the 
normal rule of the nationality of the claims which governs the question of 
the diplomatic protection of Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire.  The 
companies in question have Congolese nationality… 
95. …Guinea is without standing to offer Mr. Diallo diplomatic 
protection as regards the unlawful acts of the DRC against the rights of the 
companies Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire…”15 
 
The Court’s ruling in Diallo has been critiqued as “unfavourable to foreign 
investors by having lowered the number of States that can protect the legal persons in 
which such investors have invested.” 16   Seen another way, the Diallo ruling 
demonstrated an exclusive preference for the State of the nationality of the 
corporation as the only State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in matters 
involving rights pertaining to the corporation.  This departure from the exception in 
Barcelona Traction effectively discourages States of the nationality of foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, supra note 5 at. 615-616, paras. 89 – 95. 
16 Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, Foreign Investors, Diplomatic Protection and the International Court of 
Justice’s Decision on Preliminary Objections in the Diallo Case, 33 North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation 437, 454 (Spring 2008). 
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shareholders from resorting to the Court in the future for legal redress with respect to 
investor claims.   
Admittedly, it is not only the Diallo ruling that manifests a rigid disinclination 
against enabling States of the nationality of the foreign investor/minority shareholder 
to bring investor claims to the Court.  For one, the Court had already declined 
jurisdiction in three cases involving foreign investment claims brought to the Court 
from forty to sixty years ago.17 For another, even in the two rare investment cases of 
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) case and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay18 where 
the Court proceeded to adjudication on the merits in these disputes, the Court was not 
immune from criticism as to its handling of technical and evidentiary issues 
specifically inherent to foreign investment undertakings.19 According to one scholar 
in relation to the ELSI case:  
“a Chamber of the ICJ ruled against the United States even though the 
United States established that the Italian government had violated its own 
law in requisitioning ELSI before its parent companies could exercise a 
plan of orderly liquidation….The Chamber did not indicate what further 
evidence it needed to establish that factual predicate; it apparently wanted 
the United States to provide with a high degree of certainty that the Italian 
government prevented a specific course of events from occurring….The 
Chamber showed little sensitivity to the potential for even the most 
financially distressed company to wind down its operations in a manner 
more beneficial to its creditors and owners than declaring bankruptcy.”20   
 
In the 2010 Pulp Mills case, it was two of the senior Judges of the Court who 
themselves pointed out in a famous dissent that the Court deficiently handled the 
voluminous scientific evidence involved in the case: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (Jurisdiction), Judgment of July 22, 1952: I.C.J. Reports 1952, at 93; 
Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment of July 6, 1957: I.C.J. Reports 1957, at 9; Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, at 36. 
18 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, at 15; Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, at 14. 
19 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, at 15.  See Sean D. Murphy, The 
ELSI case: An Investment Dispute at the International Court of Justice, 16 Yale Journal of 
International Law 391 (1991); Kurt J. Hamrock, The ELSI Case:  Toward an International Definition 
of Arbitrary Conduct, 27 Texas International Law Journal 837 (1992); F.A. Mann, Foreign Investment 
in the International Court of Justice: The ELSI Case, 86 American Journal of International Law 92 
(1992).  For famous criticisms of ICJ Judge Al-Khasawneh and ICJ Judge Simma on the Court’s poor 
handling of scientific evidence in Pulp Mills, see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. 
Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and 
Simma), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15879.pdf (visited September 20, 2012). 
20 See Sean D. Murphy, The ELSI case: An Investment Dispute at the International Court of Justice, 16 
Yale Journal of International Law 391, 450-451 (1991). 
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“While we agree with the Judgment’s finding of a breach by 
Uruguay of its procedural obligations, we cannot endorse operative 
paragraph 2 of the Judgment of the Court, and have accordingly voted 
against it. As we will explain in the following dissent, the Court has 
evaluated the scientific evidence brought before it by the Parties in ways 
that we consider flawed methodologically: the Court has not followed the 
path it ought to have pursued with regard to disputed scientific facts; it has 
omitted to resort to the possibilities provided by its Statute and thus simply 
has not done what would have been necessary in order to arrive at a basis 
for the application of the law to the facts as scientifically certain as is 
possible in a judicial proceeding. Therefore, faced with the results of a 
deficient method of scientific fact-finding, we are not in a position to 
agree “that the Eastern Republic of Uruguay has not breached its 
substantive obligations under Articles 35, 36 and 41 of the 1975 Statute of 
the River Uruguay”. The evidence submitted by Uruguay to establish this 
result has not been treated lege artis by the Court; the same is valid for the 
evidence submitted by Argentina in order for the Court to arrive at the 
opposite conclusion. Consequently, and logically, we have no other 
possibility than to dissent.”21 
 
Juxtaposing the Court’s thin (and regrettably criticized) record in the 
adjudication of investment disputes with the emergence of the “self-contained dispute 
resolution system”22 of investment treaty arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the 
further stringency of the Court’s position on diplomatic protection in the Diallo ruling 
makes it understandable that foreign investment disputes are rarely brought now to 
the Court for its adjudication.  This does not mean, however, that there is no space 
whatsoever for the Court within the international investment dispute settlement 
process.  The ICSID Convention itself provides for resort to the Court.  Article 64 of 
the ICSID Convention contains a broadly worded clause compromissoire that 
deliberately enables referrals of certain disputes to the Court: 
“Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by 
negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Pulp Mills, see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2010, (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/135/15879.pdf (visited September 20, 2012), para. 2.  See also CAROLINE E. 
FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS:  
EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF AND FINALITY 134 (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
22 ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS:  WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). 
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application of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree 
to another method of settlement.”23 
 
While the foregoing language appears to encompass a broad range of disputes 
that could be subsumed under “disputes concerning the interpretation or application 
of the Convention”, in practice, the actual subject-matter perceived to be within the 
scope of Article 64 has been whittled away by the specific interpretation attached to 
this provision through the Report of the Executive Directors to the Convention 
[hereafter, “the Report”], which states: 
 
“45.  Article 64 confers on the International Court of Justice jurisdiction 
over disputes between Contracting States regarding the interpretation or 
application of the Convention which are not settled by negotiation and 
which the parties do not agree to settle by other methods.  While the 
provision is couched in general terms, it must be read in the context of the 
Convention as a whole.  Specifically, the provision does not confer 
jurisdiction on the Court to review the decision of a Conciliation 
Commission or Arbitral Tribunal as to its competence with respect to any 
dispute before it.  Nor does it empower a State to institute proceedings 
before the Court in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and 
another Contracting State have consented to submit or have submitted to 
arbitration, since such proceedings would contravene the provisions of 
Article 27, unless the other Contracting State had failed to abide by and 
comply with the award rendered in the dispute.”24  
 
The disparity between the text of Article 64 and the specific interpretation of 
the Executive Directors above poses some consequences for how the Court has been 
perceived within the “self-contained” dispute resolution system designed under the 
ICSID Convention.  This article re-examines the pragmatic uses and interpretive 
limitations to the above Article 64 mechanism for referrals to the International Court 
of Justice, and shows why, despite the tension between the Report’s interpretation and 
the Court’s treatment of similar clause compromissoires in its jurisprudential history, 
there might be a wider elasticity to the scope of jurisdiction ratione materiae under 
Article 64.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 ICSID Convention, Article 64. 
24 CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH, AND ANTHONY SINCLAIR, THE 
ICSID CONVENTION:  A COMMENTARY 1260 (Cambridge University Press, 2011), citing the Report of 
the Executive Directors to the Convention, 1 ICSID Reports 32/3.  Italics added. 
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As I show in Part II  (Court of Last Resort, but not Appeal:  the Article 64 
Clause Compromissoire in the ICSID Convention), the Report’s interpretation 
depicted the Court as forever debarred from exercising any form of judicial review 
over any aspect of a pending investment arbitration.  The persuasive power of this 
interpretation is such, that to date, no State has ever attempted to invoke the Court’s 
jurisdiction through Article 64 of the ICSID Convention.  While the Report’s 
interpretation rightly preserves the integrity and exclusivity of the choice of forum 
consistently with Article 26 of the ICSID Convention,25 and also reinforces the 
express prohibition in Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention against States extending 
diplomatic protection over disputes already submitted to arbitration,26 the effect of the 
Report’s interpretation also creates a quandary regarding the perceived limited scope 
of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione, despite the absence of this restrictive meaning 
from the face of the text of Article 64.  Significantly, two scholars have recently 
argued that the Report has the legal status of “context”27 that is part of the ICSID 
Convention, indicating that the Report “is a particularly reliable means of interpreting 
the ICSID Convention, but also that it is endowed with binding force for the purpose 
of interpreting the Convention.”  Following the Report’s interpretation of Article 64 
in conjunction with Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention, therefore, resort to the 
Court can never be made unless a Contracting State fails to comply with an arbitral 
award. The Report’s interpretation also rules out any role for the Court in the review 
of arbitral awards.  In this sense, while the Court will not operate as an appellate court 
for ICSID arbitral awards, it may still be seen as a possible “court of last resort” with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ICSID Convention, Article 26:  “Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, 
unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy.  A 
Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition 
of its consent to arbitration under this Convention.” 
26 ICSID Convention, Article 27: “(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring 
an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State 
shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such 
Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.” 
27 Barton Legum and William Kirtley, The Status of the Report of the Executive Directors on the ICSID 
Convention, ICSID Review (2012); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(2):   
“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.” 
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respect to failed exequatur of ICSID arbitral awards28 against recalcitrant Contracting 
States Parties to the ICSID Convention.29 
I submit, however, that the Report’s interpretation would not necessarily be a 
reliable predictor of how the Court would react in the future to the Report’s 
interpretive ring fencing of its jurisdiction.  As I show in Part III (The Court’s 
Judicial Function in Support of ICSID Arbitration), the Court’s treatment of 
similarly-worded clauses compromissoires in its history of jurisprudence reveals a 
significant predisposition to independently and objectively define a “dispute on the 
application or interpretation” of a treaty according to the facts before it, as submitted 
in the Application and the parties’ pleadings; to ascertain the Court’s jurisdiction 
according to its own Statute and rules on admissibility; and to determine whether (and 
delineate which) claims advanced by an applicant State fall within the ambit of the 
clause compromissoire, when the latter is the basis for the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court. The Court’s analysis does not even limit itself to inter-State acts, as it may 
extend its inquiry to domestic proceedings in States when the same allegedly amount 
to a breach of international obligations that are within the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae stipulated in the clause compromissoire. 30  Accordingly, “when a 
compromissory clause in a treaty provides for the Court’s jurisdiction, that 
jurisdiction exists only in respect of the parties to the treaty who are bound by that 
clause and within the limits set out therein.”31  For this reason, while the authoritative 
commentary to the ICSID Convention appears to confine the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction under Article 64 of the ICSID Convention to matters that do not involve 
pending arbitrations, it is entirely possible that the Court may not necessarily find 
itself bound to take this view.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Recognition and enforcement of an ICSID award should be easily accomplished through mere 
presentation of a copy of the ICSID-certified award to a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention.  
See Antonio R. Parra, The Enforcement of ICSID Arbitral Awards, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL 
AWARDS AGAINST SOVEREIGNS 131-138 (R. Doak Bishop (Ed.), (Juris Publishing Co., 2009). 
29 On the real possibility that recalcitrant States invoke State immunity in local proceedings for 
execution of an ICSID arbitral award, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, State Immunity and the Enforcement of 
Investor-State Arbitral Awards, Chapter 17, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August 
Reinisch, and Stephan Wittich (Eds.), (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
30 See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2004, at 12, paras. 30-32. 
31 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, at 32, para. 65. 
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The fundamental purpose behind the Report’s restrictive interpretation of the 
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 64 is to prevent disruptions to the arbitral process.  I 
suggest that another reading of Article 64 in relation to Articles 26 and 27(1) of the 
ICSID Convention could, and would, support this fundamental purpose.  What Article 
27(1) of the ICSID Convention prohibits in relation to Article 64 is the simultaneous 
bringing of international claims “in respect of a dispute” between an investor and a 
respondent State that has already been submitted to the arbitral procedure.  As August 
Reinisch and Loretta Malintoppi rightly observe, “[j]urisdiction over genuine 
investment disputes between States should not be confused with the International 
Court of Justice’s jurisdiction over disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the ICSID Convention according to Article 64 of the Convention.”32  
Matters short of the actual investment dispute, therefore, should be deemed well-
within the coverage of Article 64.  As such, I propose that the Court’s jurisdiction 
ratione materiae under Article 64 might be invoked for three exceptional situations 
that are also highly significant to preserving the parties’ exclusive choice of forum 
through ICSID arbitration.  In these three narrow cases, the Court’s authority could be 
legitimately and lawfully solicited, without necessarily incurring the hazards of 
intrusive review de novo because of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in relation to 
a pending arbitral dispute.   
First, I propose that Article 64 could be used to seek urgent provisional 
measures or immediate interim relief against the extreme situation where a State party 
to the dispute commits acts that seriously imperil the subject-matter of the investor-
State dispute, during the period from the time of the registration of the request for 
arbitration up to the period before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.33 This is an 
extremely narrow and urgent situation, and admittedly has not yet arisen in 
international investment disputes.  The theoretical possibility may be worth exploring, 
however, as this matter was left unaddressed by the Report of the Executive Directors 
to the Convention. In extreme circumstances where a recalcitrant State acts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  August Reinisch and Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 691-720, 717 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, 
Christoph Schreuer (Eds.), (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
33 The period for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal from the time of the issuance by the ICSID 
Secretariat of the notice of the registration of the request is a maximum of 90 days, after which the 
ICSID Chairman appoints the arbitrators pursuant to Article 38 of the ICSID Convention.  See ICSID 
Convention, Articles 37 and 38. 
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aggressively to subvert the arbitration at the earliest stages when only a request for 
arbitration has been filed and a tribunal has not yet been constituted, this rare situation 
may be appropriate for a party to invoke the limited authority of the Court simply to 
ensure that the arbitral process is not ultimately mooted by the acts of any State party 
to the dispute.  During this limited period when the arbitral tribunal has not been 
constituted, and a State party to the dispute acts with extreme prejudice against the 
subject-matter of the dispute or the evidence to be presented in the arbitral 
proceeding, I submit that either the State of the nationality of the investor claimant, or 
the respondent State, should be able to invoke the clause compromissoire in Article 
64 of the ICSID Convention in order to apply to the Court for the indication of 
provisional measures, pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice.34  In this matter, the Court does not review any aspect of the dispute on the 
merits, but rather acts in limine, only to determine whether interim measures are 
warranted to protect the subject-matter of the dispute, ensure that parties proceed to 
their chosen arbitration procedure, and thus safeguard against a party’s circumvention 
of the arbitration before the arbitral tribunal has been constituted.   
Second, I submit that Article 64 could also be invoked to seek relief against 
States seeking to thwart or resist participation in ICSID proceedings using parallel 
domestic court actions.35  While a State’s willful refusal to participate in the arbitral 
proceedings will certainly not prevent an arbitral tribunal from rendering an award 
based on the evidence submitted by a claimant,36 it is also possible that parallel 
proceedings deliberately initiated by a State before its domestic courts could be 
interposed by a State in the future to deny recognition or enforcement of a 
Convention award.37  An application brought to the Court through Article 64 of the 
ICSID Convention could thus seek injunctive relief against a State that initiates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 41:   
“1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any 
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties 
and to the Security Council.” 
35 For some examples of interference by domestic courts in investment arbitration, see Christoph 
Schreuer, Interaction of International Tribunals and Domestic Courts in Investment Law,  in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 71-
94, 87-88 (Arthur W. Rovine (Ed.), (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010); Charles Claypoole, Recent 
Developments in the Jurisprudence of Investment Arbitration Tribunals, The European and Middle 
Eastern Arbitration Review (2012). 
36 See ICSID Convention, Article 45. 
37 See Victorino J. Tejera Perez, Diplomatic Protection Revival for Failure to Comply with Investment 
Arbitration Awards, 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1093 (2012). 
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proceedings on identical causes of action as the investment arbitration before its 
domestic courts,38 as a maneuver to avoid complying with its obligation under Article 
26 of the ICSID Convention to respect the exclusive choice of forum through the 
arbitral process.  This application will not involve the Court’s review of the merits of 
the pending dispute, but rather would be limited to the question of State responsibility 
for willfully thwarting and subverting the exclusive remedy of arbitration chosen 
under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, due to domestic court interference 
tolerated or encouraged by a State.39 
Third, Article 64 could also be invoked to seek post-award conservatory 
measures from the Court to help ensure a State’s recognition or enforcement of a 
Convention award.40 While an arbitral tribunal has the power to issue provisional 
measures pursuant to Article 47 of the ICSID Convention,41 this power subsists only 
insofar as the arbitral tribunal remains in existence.  There is no provision in the 
ICSID Convention for a State or an investor to apply for conservatory measures that 
protect the subject-matter of the dispute, after the tribunal has rendered its award and 
the party claimant is seeking its recognition or enforcement, either in the courts of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Note that the arbitral tribunal in Lauder declined to hold that a respondent State committed an abuse 
of process when it pursued remedies in its local courts simultaneously with the arbitration, since “all 
the other court and arbitration proceedings involve different parties and different causes of 
action…Therefore, no possibility exists that any other court or arbitral tribunal can render a decision 
similar to or inconsistent with the award which will be issued by this Arbitral Tribunal, i.e. that the 
Czech Republic breached or did not breach the Treaty, and is or is not liable for damages towards Mr. 
Lauder.”  See Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, UNCITRAL ad hoc, September 3, 2001, para 
171.  A fortiori, should an action be brought on an identical cause of action before the local courts (e.g. 
breach by the respondent State of the same investment treaty), there would be basis to argue that an 
abuse of process had taken place. 
39 See Lanco International Inc. v. Argentina, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/6, December 8, 1998, para. 40:  “Finally, it should be noted that Article 26, as a rule of 
judicial abstention of local courts, is underpinned by Article 64 of the ICSID Convention, which 
provides that the International Court of Justice will be called on to settle any issues of interpretation 
among Contracting States; thus if a local court does not apply that norm, it may expose its own State to 
an international claim under Article 64 of the ICSID Convention.”  (Italics added.) 
40 Although compliance with ICSID awards is the norm, one State’s non-compliance with ICSID 
awards has emerged as a recent phenomenon.  See Christopher M. Ryan, Discerning the Compliance 
Calculus:  Why States Comply with International Investment Law, 38 Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 63 (2009-2010); Charity L. Goodman, Uncharted Waters:  Financial Crisis and 
Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 (2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law 449, 453-454 (2007) 449; Tsai-Yun Lin, Systemic Reflections on Argentina’s Non-
Compliance with ICSID Arbitral Awards:  A New Role of the Annulment Committee at Enforcement?, 5 
Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 1, 1-22 (May 2012); Sylvia T. Tonova, Compliance and 
Enforcement of Awards:  Is there a Practical Difference between ICSID and Non-ICSID Awards?, in 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. 5, Chapter 9 (2012). 
41 ICSID Convention, Article 47:  “Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it 
considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be 
taken to preserve the rights of either party.” 
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respondent State, or in other jurisdictions of States Parties to the ICSID Convention 
where the respondent State has assets. 
These three issues briefly sketch certain areas in which the ICSID Convention 
appears silent, and where it would be opportune for the Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction ratione materiae on a “dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application” of the ICSID Convention without imperiling the “self-contained”42 
nature of the investment arbitral process.  In these three issues, the Court wields its 
judicial function in a manner similar to that of local judicial courts that support the 
arbitral process in international commercial arbitration.43 The Court in these instances 
would not directly adjudicate the investment dispute, but rather, only assumes a 
‘policing’ 44  function to ensure that States comply with their international 
responsibilities under the ICSID Convention, such as to abide in good faith with the 
exclusive choice of forum in the arbitral proceeding,45 and to adequately ensure the 
recognition and enforcement of Convention awards.46 States that bring applications to 
the Court according to this tenor of argument thus cannot be said to violate the 
prohibition in Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention against extending diplomatic 
protection “in respect of a dispute”.47  The Court would not, in any case, be 
adjudicating the dispute itself, but rather, would exercise its authority mainly to 
declare whether a State is in breach of such obligations under the ICSID Convention. 
Nonetheless, in proposing this reading of Article 64, I acknowledge certain 
justified criticisms against any protracted involvement by the Court in the settlement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Improving the System of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement:  An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 
(OECD, 2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/internationalinvestmentagreements/40079647.pdf 
(visited September 20, 2012). 
43 See, e.g., Article 28(2) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration:  “Before the file is transmitted to the arbitral 
tribunal, and in appropriate circumstances even thereafter, the parties may apply to any competent 
judicial authority for interim or conservatory measures.”; Article 17(H) (Recognition and enforcement 
of interim measures), and Article 17(J) (Court-ordered interim measures) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 
44 On the policing function of national courts in support of international commercial arbitration, see 
ALAN REDFERN, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 329 (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2004). 
45 ICSID Convention, Article 26. 
46 ICSID Convention, Articles 53 and 54. 
47 ICSID Convention, Article 27(1). 
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of international investment disputes.48 There would likewise be advantages and 
disadvantages to making an Article 64 referral of a dispute to the Court based on any 
of the three issues identified above.  The Court’s litigation procedures or current 
docket may appear too prohibitive against giving timely provisional relief, such as 
that which may be necessitated during the 90 day period before the constitution of an 
arbitral tribunal when a claimant or State cannot bring a plea for provisional or 
interim measures anywhere else within the arbitral process.  However, as I also 
consider in this article, the Court’s own rules also contain a remarkable flexibility that 
the Court has, at times, maximized in order to be responsive to emergency situations, 
especially in issuing provisional relief during the pendency of the question of the 
Court’s jurisdiction.   
The point, therefore, is not to dismiss the Court’s relevance to international 
investment disputes altogether simply because of the restrictive interpretation of its 
jurisdiction under the Report of the Executive Directors to the ICSID Convention.  
Rather, this article attempts to show possibilities where the Court’s judicial function, 
when appropriately invoked, could be most useful to have States toe the line 
according to the “self-contained” dispute resolution system designed under the ICSID 
Convention.  A State choosing to refer a dispute to the Court through the Article 64 
mechanism will always have to calibrate policy considerations such as procedural 
expediency and timeliness, the authoritativeness and practical implementation of a 
Court decision, the effectiveness of a Court decision in relation to the strategic 
objectives of the State making the referral, and the legal quality of the Court’s 
decisions.49  States’ current reluctance to refer disputes to the Court under Article 64 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See Christian J. Tams, An Appealing Option?  The Debate About an ICSID Appellate Structure, 57 
Essays in Transnational Economic Law 38-40 (2006), available at http://www.telc.uni-
halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft57.pdf ( visited September 20, 2012).  On some general 
advantages and disadvantages to ICJ litigation, see Rosalyn Higgins, Remedies and the International 
Court of Justice:  An Introduction, in ROSALYN HIGGINS, THEMES AND THEORIES:  SELECTED ESSAYS, 
SPEECHES, AND WRITINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Chapter 7.10 (Oxford University Press, 2009).  On 
the finding of bias in the decision-making of the International Court of Justice where judges allegedly 
“favor states that appoint them” and “favor states whose wealth level is close to that of the judge’s own 
state”, see Eric A. Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased, 
December 13, 2004, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/234.eap_.icj-bias.pdf (visited 
September 20, 2012). 
49 See CONNIE PECK AND ROY S. LEE (EDS.), INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997); W. Michael Reisman had pointed out instances 
where, “in the past, the International Court of Justice has misstated its own prior holdings by selective 
quotation.  In each instance, the partial quotation was invoked as the authority for the opposite of what 
the Court has said.”  W. Michael Reisman, Respecting One’s Own Jurisprudence:  A Plea to the 
International Court of Justice (Editorial Comment), 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 312 (1989); Michael Gilligan, 
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of the ICSID Convention could very likely be attributed both to the self-imposed 
conservative view in regard to the actual remit of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione 
materiae under the terms of this particular clause compromissoire, as well as to 
States’ lingering skepticism of the efficacy and practical contributions of the Court in 
the matter of settling international investment disputes.   
Finally, one cannot overemphasize the importance of reassessing the 
prevailing negative perceptions and low expectations of the Court’s possible 
contribution to the international investment dispute settlement process.  Recent acts of 
State recalcitrance against complying with the ICSID Convention50 further conveys 
that the supposedly “self-contained” dispute resolution mechanism in the ICSID 
Convention is not hermetically sealed from questions of inter-State responsibility.  In 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Leslie Johns, Peter Rosendorff, Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of 
Disputes, unpublished paper dated September 26, 2007, available at 
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2601/GJR_070926.pdf (visited September 20, 2012), finding that 
“[i]f the court does not have jurisdiction or its rulings do not appreciably change the bargaining 
outcomes between the disputants, then the plaintiff’s private information about tis legal claim is 
irrelevant.  Asymmetric information about the validity of legal claims is important only when the court 
has an impact on the final outcome” (at 34).  
50 See Robert J. Shapiro, Obama should not reward Argentina’s bad behavior, Washington Examiner, 
April 17, 2012 (“So egregious is Argentina’s disregard for international law and covenants that it 
accounts for 78 percent of all cases brought against G-20 countries in the World Bank’s International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.  ICSID has issued awards totaling nearly $1 billion in 
cases so far against Argentina, which it refuses to respect.  Beyond ICSID, other countries find 
themselves in disputes over Argentina’s economic actions.  This week, Spain is the most obvious 
example, with Kirchner’s peremptory nationalization of YPF/Repsol.”), available at 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/obama-should-not-reward-argentinas-bad-
behavior/article/509126#.UGvGrY59SKg (visited September 20, 2012); Giuliana Cané, The 
Enforcement of ICSID Awards; Revolutionary of Ineffective?, 15 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 439, 460 (2004) 
(“A plea of immunity from execution by a State frustrates enforcement of the award, thereby excusing 
it from its obligation under the Convention to comply with the award…Even though the majority of 
international arbitrations, and those of ICSID in particular, conclude successfully, ‘the utility of the 
mechanism should not be predicated on the unpredictable conduct of parties.  Thus it may be 
worthwhile to amend the ICSID Convention to eliminate the impact of sovereign immunity in the 
execution of the award.”); Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the 
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7 Annual 
Survey of International and Comparative Law 21, 31-39 (2001) (summarizing the variant practices of 
domestic courts from various jurisdictions as to how they accept the defense of sovereign immunity as 
a bar against execution or enforcement of ICSID awards). 
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II.  Court of Last Resort, but not Appeal:  the Article 64 Clause 
Compromissoire in the ICSID Convention 
 
As the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”,51 the International 
Court of Justice occupies a central role in the development of international law and 
the settlement of inter-State disputes.52  Its predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, was founded during a climate of idealistic optimism that 
embraced cooperation and the cause of internationalism among the Great Powers.53  
Recognizing the increased complexity and diversity in the global community and the 
proliferation of many other international courts and tribunals, Judge Christopher 
Greenwood stresses several features of the International Court of Justice that 
continues to set it apart from all others:   
“[The Court] has a universality which other courts and tribunals do 
not possess.  Any of the 192 member States of the United Nations can be 
parties to cases before it and all can participate in the vote in the General 
Assembly to elect the judges of the Court…The Court is also universal in 
another sense.  Unlike specialized courts and tribunals whose jurisdiction 
is confined to particular areas of international law…the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice covers the whole field of international law… 
..What, then, is the significance of the Court in international life?  It 
would be easy to conclude that a court which no genuinely compulsory 
jurisdiction and which cannot turn to any of the normal apparatus of the 
State (on which national courts can rely) to enforce the judgments which it 
gives cannot play a significant role.  Such a conclusion would be facile 
and misleading….[Firstly], the Court has played an important role in 
settling a range of disputes which the parties have chosen, by mutual 
agreement, to refer to it…Secondly, even in those cases (which are a clear 
majority) in which the Court is seised by only one party to a dispute, the 
Court’s verdict has almost always been accepted, even if 
reluctantly...Thirdly, notwithstanding the relative lack of machinery for 
the enforcement of judgments of the Court, in practice those judgments 
have generally been complied with…Fourthly, I want to highlight what I 
regard as a particular success on the part of the Court, albeit one that has 
not always been free of controversy.  Between the late 1960s and early 
1980s the international law of the sea underwent dramatic changes… 
These factors created a potential for numerous conflicts. In practice, 
however, those conflicts have generally been avoided in large part due to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XIV, Article 92. 
52 See MOHAMMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS THE 
PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 177-277 (Kluwer Law International, 2003). 
53 See MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD:  THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 2375-2376 (Penguin 
Press, 2012); Edward Gordon, The ICJ: On Its Own, 40 Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 74, 77-80 (2011-2012). 
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series of rulings on maritime boundaries which have not only resolved the 
specific disputes to which they related but also articulated a body of 
principles for the determination of overlapping claims which have built up 
into a substantial body of law. While some of the decisions in question 
have emanated from arbitration tribunals, by far the largest contribution 
comes from the ten judgments of the International Court of Justice.  
Lastly, while no-one would argue that the International Court (or any of 
the other international institutions) has realized the dreams of some of 
those who, at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 saw 
international adjudication as something that would abolish war, it is worth 
noting the record of the Court in resolving disputes which had led to 
outbreaks of fighting…”54 
Given its historical importance and the generally high quality of its 
decisions,55 it is remarkable that the International Court of Justice was edged out from 
direct adjudication of international investment disputes when the ICSID Convention 
was drafted.  This is not entirely inexplicable.  As previously discussed in the 
Introduction,56 the Court’s thin (and at times criticized) record in handling the few 
cases of diplomatic espousal involving foreign investment claims did not inspire 
much confidence.  According to Professor Christoph Schreuer, the drafting history 
behind the ICSID Convention reveals a deliberate preference of the delegates not to 
permit interim or preliminary rulings by the Court in cases pending before a tribunal 
or commission, as well as not to permit the Court to review an arbitral award issued 
under the Convention: 
“The relationship of what eventually became Art. 64 to cases 
pending before a tribunal or commission or decided by a tribunal was the 
subject of extensive discussions during the Convention’s drafting…A 
‘tentative amendment’ was tabled to allow arbitration proceedings to be 
suspended to seek a ruling of the ICJ on a matter concerning the 
Convention’s interpretation or application…The reason put forward was a 
possible lack of familiarity of arbitrators with the technicalities of 
international law and the desire to attain uniformity in the Convention’s 
application…The expectation was that either the host State or the State of 
the investor’s nationality would initiate contentious proceedings before the 
ICJ…But the idea that the Centre or the tribunal itself might somehow 
seek an advisory opinion was also aired. 
Objections to this planned amendment included the fear that 
recourse to the ICJ might be used as dilatory tactics and that it would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Judge Christopher Greenwood, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Global 
Community, 17 U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 233, 241-252 (Spring 2011). 
55 LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 134-135 (, 2001) (“the 
decisions of the International Court of Justice are, on the whole, regarded by international lawyers as 
highly persuasive authority of existing international law”). 
56 Page 6 of this Article. 
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contrary to the Convention’s objective to insulate ICSID proceedings from 
inter-State disputes… 
The proposal was quietly dropped.  But there was concern that Art. 
64, even as eventually adopted, might lead to a frustration of arbitration 
proceedings through resort to the ICJ.  A proposed amendment to rule out 
this possibility was withdrawn when it was agreed that the comments, 
attached to the Convention, would make it quite clear that Art. 64 would in 
no case enable a State party to an arbitration to frustrate the proceedings 
by a referral of the matter to the ICJ…”57 
 
As discussed in the Introduction,58 the Report of the Executive Directors to 
the Convention specifically carved out any review of decisions of arbitral tribunals or 
conciliation commissions from the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 64 of the 
ICSID Convention.  The Report further interpreted Article 64 in relation to Article 27 
to mean that no State could institute proceedings before the Court “in respect of a 
dispute” when the same has been submitted to arbitration.59  Under no circumstances 
was the Court ever supposed to operate as an appellate court for international 
investment awards,60 a position all the more emphasized by the fact that the ICSID 
Convention itself already provides for an internal system of interpretation, revision, 
and annulment of awards.61 
What, then, is the subject-matter left to the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court under Article 64 of the ICSID Convention? 
There is no question that one such subject-matter62 is the party’s duty to 
comply with its obligation under Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention to “abide by 
and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, WITH LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH, ANTHONY SINCLAIR, THE 
ICSID CONVENTION:  A COMMENTARY 1259-1260 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) [hereafter, 
“ICSID Commentary”]. 
58 See supra note 24. 
59 Id. 
60 On the proposal for an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court, see Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy 
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:  Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent 
Decisions, 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 1617-1625 (2005). 
61 ICSID Convention, Articles 50 to 52.  See LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON, NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO 
ICSID ARBITRATION 159-190 (Kluwer Law International, 2011); MARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES:  CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 182-185 (Eleven 
International Publishing, 2008) (surveying proposals for a central appellate mechanism in international 
investment law, all of which do not involve the International Court of Justice). 
62  See Christoph Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Relations, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS – LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 345-358, 348 (August Reinisch 
and Ursula Kriebaum (Eds.), Eleven International Publishing,2007). 
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have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention”63, as well as 
a Contracting State’s obligation under Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention to 
“recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the 
pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final 
judgment of a court in that State.”64  As explained by the ad hoc Committee in Enron 
v. Argentina,65 these two obligations address different subjects: 
 
“62. The Committee further notes that these two obligations are 
addressed to different subjects. It is clear from its context that the word 
“party” in the second sentence of Article 53(1) refers to a party to an 
award, who will be, on the one hand, a Contracting State or a constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State, and, on the other hand, a 
national of another Contracting State. That provision therefore expressly 
requires each party to an award to “comply with the terms of the award 
except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to 
the relevant provisions of this Convention ”. On the other hand, the first 
sentence of Article 54(1) is addressed to “each Contracting State” to the 
ICSID Convention, whether or not that Contracting State is a party to the 
award in question, and is not addressed to any party to an award other than 
a Contracting State. The effect of the obligation imposed on Contracting 
States by this provision is to ensure that any ICSID award can be enforced 
by either party to the award in the territory of any ICSID Contracting 
State. In other words, if an award is given against an investor in favour of 
a Contracting State or a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting 
State, Article 54(1) ensures that the Contracting State or constituent 
subdivision or agency can enforce the award in the territory of any 
Contracting State, including but not limited to its own territory or the 
territory of the investor's national State. Conversely, if an award is given 
against a Contracting State or a constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State in favour of an investor, Article 54(1) ensures that the 
investor can enforce the award in the territory of any Contracting State, 
including but not limited to the territory of the State that is, or the State of, 
the award debtor. However, Article 54(1) does not state that a party to an 
award must use the enforcement machinery established pursuant to this 
provision as a condition of the award being complied with. Nor does it 
state that a Contracting State or a constituent subdivision or agency that is 
an award debtor is entitled to decline to comply with the terms of the 
award until the enforcement machinery that exists under that Contracting 
State's own national law is used by the award creditor.”66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 ICSID Convention, Article 53(1). 
64 ICSID Convention, Article 54(1). 
65 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentina, Decision on Request for a Continued 
Stay of Enforcement of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, October 7, 2008. 
66 Supra note 58, para 62.  Italics added. 
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Where a Contracting State fails to comply with an award issued under the 
Convention, the State of the nationality of the claimant-investor or a respondent State 
may invoke the Court’s jurisdiction to compel that Contracting State to observe its 
international obligation under Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention.  When the non-
complying State is a party to the dispute (either a claimant State or a respondent 
State), the infringement of the international obligation under Article 53(1) of the 
ICSID Convention entitles any other Contracting State to invoke the Court’s 
jurisdiction through the Article 64 clause compromissoire in the ICSID Convention.  
Apart from issues of recognition and enforcement, few other potential disputes were 
also considered as within the ambit of Article 64 of the ICSID Convention, but have 
also never been tested at the Court: 
 
“During the Convention’s drafting, disputes concerning the States’ 
general duty to cooperate with the Centre, the compliance with awards, the 
recognition and enforcement of awards, as well as the immunities of the 
Centre and of persons enjoying special privileges under the Convention, 
were considered suitable for submission to the ICJ (History, Vol. II, pp. 
354, 403, 533, 906, 994, 1030).  Other matters that may lead to disputes 
between States are the duty of domestic courts not to interfere in ICSID 
proceedings (see Art. 26, paras. 132-178) or the duty of States under Art. 
27 not to give diplomatic protection in respect of disputes that are subject 
to ICSID arbitration.  By January 2008 no case had ever been brought to 
the ICJ under Art. 64.”67 
 
The Report of the Executive Directors on the ICSID Convention clearly 
prohibited States from using Article 64 to institute proceedings before the Court “in 
respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State have 
consented to submit or have submitted to arbitration, since such proceedings would 
contravene the provisions of Article 27…”68 Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention 
likewise prohibits a Contracting State from giving diplomatic protection, or bringing 
an international claim, “in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another 
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration 
under this Convention…”.69  The prohibition squarely applies only to a State that is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 ICSID Commentary, supra note 57, at 1259. 
68 Supra note 24.  
69 ICSID Convention, Article 27(1).   
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Contracting Party to the ICSID Convention, and whose national has a pending 
arbitration with another State.70  The limitation of the prohibition to matters “in 
respect of a dispute” is thus designed to preclude the submission of the same 
substantive issues pending before an arbitral proceeding to the Court.  As the arbitral 
tribunal explained in Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina:71  
“The purpose of Article 27(1) is explained in paragraph 33 of the 
Report of the Executive Directors of the Convention as follows: 
When a host State consents to the submission of a dispute with an 
investor to the Centre, thereby giving the investor direct access to 
an international jurisdiction, the investor should not be in a position 
to espouse his case and that State should not be permitted to do 
so…”72 
 
Clearly, the rationale for the prohibition against diplomatic protection under 
Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention is to prevent the multiplicity of suits before an 
arbitral tribunal and international courts on identical issues and causes of action.  As I 
show in the next section, this rationale would not be violated if the Court were to 
exercise jurisdiction under Article 64 only with respect to “gateway issues”,73 such as 
issues involving State responsibility when a recalcitrant State refuses to comply with 
the exclusive chosen remedy of arbitration under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, 
or acts in a manner intended to defeat, undermine, subvert, or thwart this chosen 
remedy.  In this latter scenario, the breach alleged against the State before the Court 
(e.g. failure to abide by Article 26 of the ICSID Convention) is wholly separate and 
distinct from the breach alleged by the investor-claimant against the State in the 
actual investment dispute (e.g. breaches of a bilateral investment treaty or other 
sources of applicable law within Article 42 of the ICSID Convention).  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela CA (Aucoven) v. Venezuela, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, September 27, 2001, para. 74. 
71 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina, Decision on Request for a Continued 
Stay of Enforcement of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, October 7, 2008. 
72 Id., at para. 64.  
73 On the analogous “gateway” issues faced by national courts in international commercial arbitration, 
see George A. Bermann, The "Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 37 Yale 
Journal of International Law 1 (2012). 
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interpretation of Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention would thus be consistent with 
that discussed by the arbitral tribunal in Sempra Energy International v. Argentina.74 
 
III. THE COURT’S JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN SUPPORT OF ICSID ARBITRATION 
Throughout its jurisprudence, the Court has not hesitated to independently 
interpret the objective meaning of a clause compromissoire in a treaty, in order to 
ascertain the limits of States’ consent to the Court’s jurisdiction.  In Questions 
Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),75 the Court 
examined a clause compromissoire (Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention 
against Torture)76 that is similarly worded to the clause compromissoire in Article 64 
of the ICSID Convention.  The Court emphasized that: 
“…in order to establish whether a dispute exists, “[i]t must be shown 
that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other” (South West 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Decision on Argentina’s Request for a Continued Stay of 
Enforcement of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, March 5, 2009, paras. 44, 46-47: 
“44. This provision [Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention] mirrors the undertaking expressed in 
Article 53 that parties to the arbitration are to abide by and comply with an ICSID award.  This is also 
quite logical.  It cannot possibly be correct that a State’s failure to comply with its international 
obligation – constituted under Article 53 – must be submitted to a national court for ultimate 
resolution.  The option of coercive enforcement is not available on the international plane, and an 
award creditor in the ICSID regime will therefore have no other choice than to seek diplomatic 
protection or to bring an international claim… 
46.  Further, in the negotiating history of the ICSID Convention, it was generally believed that States 
would voluntarily comply with awards rendered by ICSID tribunals rendering any question of 
enforcement moot.  The enforcement option provided for in Article 54 rather sought to allay any 
concern of a State party that recourse could not be had against investor parties.  One may even 
question whether there was any expectation that enforcement against a State debtor would have to be 
undertaken within that State’s own (or any other Contracting State’s) enforcement apparatus. 
47.  In general, the Committee adopts the reasoning of the Enron ad hoc committee and considers that 
it has quite succinctly identified the error in the position advocated by Argentina in the following 
words:  ‘The ICSID dispute settlement mechanism was intended to be an international method of 
settlement, and it would run counter to this intention for compliance with a final award to be subject, 
ultimately, to the provisions and mechanisms of national law.’…” 
75 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, July 
20, 2012, at 18-19. 
76 Id., at para. 42: 
“42. To found the jurisdiction of the Court, Belgium relies on Article 30, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention against Torture and on the declarations made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, 
of the Court’s Statute. Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention reads as follows: 
“Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be 
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are 
unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to 
the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.” 
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Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328). The Court has 
previously stated that “[w]hether there exists an international dispute is a 
matter for objective determination” (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J.Reports1950, p.74) and that “[t]he Court’s determination must turn 
on an examination of the facts. The matter is one of substance, not of 
form.” (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, para. 30.) The Court 
has also noted that the “dispute must in principle exist at the time the 
Application is submitted to the Court” (ibid., para. 30).”77 
 
On its independent examination of the facts before it, the Court noted that 
Senegal had complied with its obligation under Article 5(2) of the Convention against 
Torture, and as such, the dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of 
the Convention against Torture had already ended by the time that Belgium filed its 
Application.78  With respect to the international obligation under Article 6(2) and 
Article 7(1) of the Convention against Torture, the Court found that there was a 
dispute on the “interpretation or application” of the Convention that still existed 
between Belgium and Senegal, since both States had a difference “as to how the 
execution of an obligation arising from an international instrument to which both 
States are parties should be understood.”79 
Furthermore, the Court has been notably careful to determine the temporal 
limitations to its jurisdiction in relation to a treaty’s clause compromissoire,80 as well 
as to strictly refer to the object of a State’s Application in relation to the ratione 
materiae scope of a treaty’s clause compromissoire.81  The Court considers it to be a 
“faithful discharging of its judicial function” to decide what is meant by the 
“interpretation or application” of a treaty in relation to the Court’s jurisdiction under a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Id. at para. 46. 
78 Id. at para. 48. 
79 Id. at 22, paras. 51 and 52. 
80 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy:  Greece Intervening), Judgment of February 
3, 2012, I.C.J. Reports, at  19-20, paras. 41-44. 
81  Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment of December 5, 2011, I.C.J. Reports, at 14, para. 24 and at 18-19, 
paras. 41-43; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, at 40-42, paras. 48-
52; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2007, at 832,  835, 847-848, paras. 34-38. 
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clause compromissoire.82  In its Judgment on Preliminary Objections in the Case 
Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),83 the Court stressed 
the meaning of a “dispute” on the interpretation and application of a treaty, and the 
Court’s duty to objectively determine the existence of such a “dispute”: 
 
“30. The Court recalls its established case law on that matter, 
beginning with the frequently quoted statement by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case in 
1924: “A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of 
legal views or of interests between two persons.”(Judgment No. 2, 1924, 
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11.) Whether there is a dispute in a given case 
is a matter for “objective determination” by the Court (Interpretation of 
Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74). “It must be shown that the 
claim of one party is positively opposed by the other” (South West Africa 
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328) (and most recently 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 40, para. 90). The Court’s 
determination must turn on an examination of the facts. The matter is one 
of substance, not of form. As the Court has recognized (for example, Land 
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 315, 
para. 89), the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the failure of a 
State to respond to a claim in circumstances where a response is called for. 
While the existence of a dispute and the undertaking of negotiations are 
distinct as a matter of principle, the negotiations may help demonstrate the 
existence of the dispute and delineate its subject-matter. 
 
The dispute must in principle exist at the time the Application is 
submitted to the Court (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 
1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriyav. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 25-26, paras. 42-44; Questions of 
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United 
States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1998, pp. 130-131, paras. 42-44); the Parties were in agreement with this 
proposition. Further, in terms of the subject-matter of the dispute, to return 
to the terms of Article 22 of CERD, the dispute must be “with respect to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment of December 5, 2011, I.C.J. Reports, at 22, para. 58. 
83 Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Judgment on Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. 
Reports, April 1, 2011. 
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the interpretation or application of [the] Convention”. While it is not 
necessary that a State must expressly refer to a specific treaty in its 
exchanges with the other State to enable it later to invoke that instrument 
before the Court (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 428-429, para. 83), the 
exchanges must refer to the subject-matter of the treaty with sufficient 
clarity to enable the State against which a claim is made to identify that 
there is, or may be, a dispute with regard to that subject-matter. An 
express specification would remove any doubt about one State’s 
understanding of the subject-matter in issue and put the other on 
notice…”84 
 
As seen above, the Court in Georgia v. Russia required that the disputed 
exchanges between the States in regard to a treaty must refer to its subject-matter 
“with sufficient clarity”, to qualify a dispute as one that involves the “interpretation or 
application” of that treaty.85  While it is not required that particular reference eo 
nomine be had to provisions of the treaty to identify a dispute as to its “interpretation 
or application”,86 the Court will pay significantly close attention to the text of the 
treaty’s clause compromissoire to determine the scope and limits of its compulsory 
jurisdiction.87  It will likewise examine if there are any State reservations or State 
declarations on limitations to its instrument of accession to the treaty that contains the 
clause compromissoire. 88   The scope of the court’s independent and objective 
determination of the existence of a dispute within the scope of a treaty’s clause 
compromissoire can extend to “other questions which may not be strictly capable of 
classification as matters of jurisdiction or admissibility but are of such a nature as to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Judgment on Preliminary Objections, April 1, 
2011, para. 30. 
85 See also the requirement that a dispute must “specifically concern the interpretation or application” 
of the treaty containing the clause compromissoire in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, at 41, para. 94 in relation to 43, paras. 99-101 and at 49, 
para. 118 and at 52, paras. 125-126. 
86 See Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2005, p. 6; Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of December 2, 1963, I.C.J. Reports 1963, at 15, 25, 27-28.   
87 See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2009, at 61, 70-71, paras. 20-22. 
88 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, at 6, 16-17, para. 15 
and at 21-22, para. 28 and at 32, paras. 65-67 and at 33, para. 71 in relation to 34-35, paras. 74-79 and 
at 35-36, paras. 80-81, in relation to 39, paras. 87-88 and at 40, paras. 89-90 in relation to  40-41, paras. 
91-92. 
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require examination of those matters.”89  It can examine the conduct of the States 
concerned to infer the existence of a dispute, since “a disagreement on a point of law 
or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests, or the positive opposition of the claim of 
one party by the other need not necessarily be stated expressis verbis.  In the 
determination of the existence of a dispute, as in other matters, the position or attitude 
of a party can be established by inference, whatever the professed view of that 
party.”90   
Applying the foregoing principles, if the Court were to examine a future 
application by a State that invoked the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction through the 
clause compromissoire in Article 64 of the ICSID Convention, it is not easy to 
conclude that the Court would automatically yield the definition of its jurisdiction 
ratione materiae to the restrictive interpretation made by the Report of the Executive 
Directors on the ICSID Convention.91  While the Court could very likely accept the 
Report as part of the ICSID Convention’s context, it is not precluded from 
undertaking its own objective analysis of the meaning of Article 64 of the ICSID 
Convention and the existence of a legal dispute as contemplated in this provision. 
Such being the case, I submit that Article 64 of the ICSID Convention need 
not be read exclusively according to the prohibitions and limitations set by the 
Report.  While it is entirely understandable that the drafters of the ICSID Convention 
were desirous of preventing any disruptions to ICSID arbitration proceedings by 
States’ recourse to the International Court of Justice, I submit that it would not be 
contrary to the tenor, text, and intent of the drafters of the Convention to enable an 
interpretation of Article 64 of the ICSID Convention in a manner that permits resort 
to the Court in support of the arbitration, similar to the cooperative role played by 
national courts in international commercial arbitration.  In international commercial 
arbitration, national courts provide support in various stages to arbitral proceedings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2007, at 851, para. 49, citing (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1974, at 259, para. 22; and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1974, at 463, para. 22; see also Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, at 29). 
90 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1998, 275, at 315, para. 89. 
91 Supra note 24. 
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and for recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.92  Prior to 
the establishment of a tribunal, national courts act “to uphold the agreement to 
arbitrate”.93 At the commencement of the arbitration, national courts “use [their] 
authority to give effect to the parties’ agreement by establishing an appropriate 
tribunal to take over and deal with the dispute between the parties where the 
prescribed appointment mechanism does not work”.94 During the arbitration process, 
national courts can issue “procedural orders that cannot be ordered or enforced by 
arbitrators, or orders for maintaining the status quo…orders for protecting and taking 
evidence, or otherwise protecting the integrity of the arbitration.”95 Finally, during the 
enforcement stage, national courts are crucial “(1) at the place of arbitration, i.e. when 
a party challenges and seeks to set aside the award, or lodges an appeal against the 
award under the applicable arbitral law or regime; or (2) at the place of enforcement, 
where the successful party seeks the recognition and enforcement of the award.”96 
I do not propose that the International Court of Justice assume all the 
foregoing functions of national courts in relation to international commercial 
arbitration, in order to provide strategic support to ICSID arbitration.  After all, the 
self-contained dispute resolution system in the ICSID Convention already provides 
for a settled appointments and challenge procedure for arbitrators; 97  empowers 
arbitral tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction98 (the principle of competence-
competence99), issue provisional measures to preserve the rights of parties,100 order 
document or evidentiary production and other appropriate evidentiary inquiries;101 
and further empowers parties to have arbitral awards internally interpreted, revised, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See W. Michael Reisman and Heide Iravani, Conflict and Cooperation:  The Changing Relation of 
National Courts and International Commercial Arbitration, 21 American Review of International 
Arbitration 5 (2010).  
93  Julian D.M. Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International Arbitration 
Processes?, 24(3) American University International Law Review 489, 496 (2009). 
94 Supra note 83, at 497. 
95 Id. at 497-498. 
96 Id. at 498. 
97 ICSID Convention, Articles 37 to 40. 
98 ICSID Convention, Article 41. 
99 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 863 (Kluwer Law International, 2009):  
“The ICSID Convention also recognizes the competence-competence doctrine.  Article 41(1) of the 
Convention provides that ‘the Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence’.  As noted above, this 
follows general principles of international law in both commercial and state-to-state arbitration. (At the 
same time, the ICSID Secretariat performs an unusually extensive review of Requests for Arbitration 
aimed at confirming the existence of a prima facie jurisdictional base before an arbitration may 
proceed under the ICSID Rules.)” 
100 ICSID Convention, Article 47. 
101 ICSID Convention, Article 43. 
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annulled within the ICSID system under specific circumstances.102  The usual support 
functions of national courts in international commercial arbitrations are thus, to a 
great extent, already available within the dispute resolution system under the ICSID 
Convention. 
However, I submit that there are three distinct areas in which the International 
Court of Justice can lend vital support to the ICSID arbitral process through its 
compulsory jurisdiction under Article 64 of the ICSID Convention.  These areas were 
not only left unaddressed in the ICSID Convention, but more to the point, these areas 
involve international duties that cannot be readily enforced by national courts.  I refer 
to: 1) urgent provisional measures before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal; 2) 
relief against recalcitrant States deliberately seeking to thwart, undermine, obstruct or 
resist ICSID arbitration proceedings through parallel domestic actions that involve 
identical causes of action with the arbitration, and which ultimately hamper and derail 
access to evidence and prejudice the subject-matter of the dispute in the ICSID 
arbitration; and 3) post-award conservatory measures to ensure recognition and 
enforcement of the arbitral award.  I briefly discuss how each proposal in relation to 
Article 64 of the ICSID Convention, the practical obstacles that might exist for each 
proposed referral to the Court, and how the Court could be instrumental in supporting 
the good faith observance of the parties’ exclusive choice of ICSID arbitration.   
Beyond the question of whether the Court may take cognizance of these types 
of referrals pursuant to Article 64 of the ICSID Convention, is the more urgent 
question of whether States should pursue this route in rare exceptional cases that 
threaten the integrity and continued functioning of the arbitral process. States should 
also be aware of the institutional practice, history, and rules of procedure of the Court, 
in order to properly estimate the strategic advantages and disadvantages in seeking 
relief through the Court in these rare instances.  While breaches of the ICSID 
Convention through State acts not involving issues “in respect of a [pending arbitral] 
dispute” 103  can be independently litigated at the Court, in practice apart from 
determining its jurisdiction (whether the Court could hear the case) the Court will also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 ICSID Convention, Articles 50 to 52. 
103 Supra note 24. 
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examine the admissibility of an application (whether the Court should hear a case).104  
While I attempt to sketch the general contours of these policy considerations in this 
paper, I admit that tentative and abstract theorizing has its limits, and space 
constraints for this article result in barely scratching the surface of a State’s decision-
making calculus.  Further research is necessary to fully characterize the legal nuances 
and policy gains behind any decision to initiate litigation before the International 
Court of Justice.  Realistically, all that this article can achieve is to start the policy 
conversation for States’ authoritative decision-makers on the possible uses of the 
clause compromissoire under Article 64 of the ICSID Convention. 
 
 
A. Urgent Provisional Measures before the Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
Article 37(1) of the ICSID Convention mandates that the arbitral tribunal 
“shall be constituted as soon as possible after registration of a request pursuant to 
Article 36.”105  There is no time period set by the Convention for the registration of 
the request, as in fact the ICSID Secretariat does conduct some preliminary review of 
the request for arbitration to determine if “the dispute is manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.”106  After the ICSID Secretary-General notifies the parties 
of the registration of the request for arbitration, the arbitral tribunal will be constituted 
(either upon agreement by the parties or, if the parties cannot agree, by appointment 
of the World Bank President as Chairman of the Administrative Council), within a 
period not more than 90 days after such notification was issued.107 
Nothing in the ICSID Convention indicates whether the party filing the 
request (either State or investor) can apply for urgent provisional measures during the 
period from the notice of the registration of the request, to the period before the 
arbitral tribunal is constituted.  An arbitral tribunal has the power to “recommend any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See JOHN COLLIER AND VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 155-162 (Oxford University Press, 2005). [hereafter, “COLLIER AND 
LOWE”] 
105 ICSID Convention, Article 37(1). 
106 ICSID Convention, Article 36(3).  See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
863 (Kluwer Law International, 2009):  “…At the same time, the ICSID Secretariat performs an 
unusually extensive review of Requests for Arbitration aimed at confirming the existence of a prima 
facie jurisdictional base before an arbitration may proceed under the ICSID Rules.” 
107 ICSID Convention, Articles 37 and 38. 
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provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either 
party”,108 but this power presupposes the existence of the tribunal.  While Rule 39 of 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules enables a party to request for provisional measures “at 
any time after the institution of the proceeding”, the ICSID Secretary-General merely 
“fix[es] time limits for the parties to present observations on the request, so that the 
request and observations may be considered by the Tribunal promptly upon its 
constitution.”109  Significantly, Rule 39(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules explicitly 
maintains that “[n]othing in this Rule shall prevent the parties, provided that they 
have so stipulated in the agreement recording their consent, from requesting any 
judicial or other authority to order provisional measures, prior to or after the 
institution of the proceeding, for the preservation of their respective rights and 
interests.”110  While it has been observed that these provisions in Rule 39 “eliminate a 
significant practical roadblock for any party whose rights are in immediate jeopardy”, 
it has also been conceded that “even with these revisions, the process may still 
involve significant delays, so the parties may be well advised to consider seeking 
provisional measures in domestic courts as well, if they are available.”111 
Apart from domestic courts, would the International Court of Justice be a 
viable forum to apply for provisional measures during this intervening period between 
the filing of a request for arbitration and the constitution of the arbitral tribunal? It 
might not appear so, because Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention specifically 
prohibits any Contracting State from “giv[ing] diplomatic protection, or bring[ing] an 
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another 
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration 
under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide 
by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.”112  This prohibition operates 
to bar bringing the same claim subject of the pending arbitral dispute to the Court.  As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 ICSID Convention, Article 47. 
109 ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 39(1) and Rule 39(5). 
110 ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 39(5). 
111 See Steven P. Finizio, Ethan G. Shenkman, and Julian Davis Mortenson, Recent Developments in 
Investor-State Arbitration:  Effective Use of Provisional Measures, Global Arbitration Review (2007), 
available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/d76150c5-651f-4fb2-ae40-
2334c60fe8ca/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b8503dde-d3c8-4c8d-9cc9-
2c180a7203d3/investor_state_arbitration.pdf (visited September 20, 2012); L. Yves Fortier, Interim 
Measures:  An Arbitrator’s Provisional Views, June 16, 2008, available at http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12232952989920/1115_001.pdf (visited September 20, 2012). 
112 ICSID Convention, Article 27(1). 
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aptly described by several scholars, a State’s espousal of a claim means adopting the 
national’s grievance ‘as its own’: 
“Before an investor can rely upon the formal support of its home 
State, the government must ‘espouse’ his claim, adopting the grievance as 
its own and raising it to the international plane.  Otherwise known as 
‘diplomatic protection’, espousal is a completely discretionary right of the 
State – citizens may request that their claims be espoused, but it is 
impossible to compel the State to comply.  Once a State has espoused a 
claim, it assumes all related rights and obligations, leaving the investor 
with little control over the dispute resolution process, and even over the 
remedy.  In the formulation of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice,  
‘by taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to 
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a 
state is in reality asserting its own rights, its right to ensure, in the person 
of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law’.”113 
 
Short of the State’s adoption of the investor’s claim, therefore, it would be 
hard to trigger the prohibition against diplomatic protection under Article 27(1) of the 
ICSID Convention.  In this regard, the arbitral tribunal’s conclusions in Pac Rim 
Cayman LLC v. El Salvador114 are illuminating as to how the tribunal differentiated 
matters that did not amount to the exercise of diplomatic protection “in respect of a 
dispute” subject of a pending investment arbitration.  In Pac Rim, the arbitral tribunal 
held that the extensive consultation procedures115 and provisions on notification and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 N. STEPHAN KINSELLA AND NOAH D. RUBINS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK, AND 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 406-407 (Oxford University Press, 2005), citing 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 2 (1924) at 12. 
114 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, June 1, 2012. 
115 Central American Free Trade Agreement, Article 20.4 (Consultations): 
“1.  Any Party may request in writing consultations with any other Party with respect to any actual or 
proposed measure or any other matter that it considers might affect the operation of this Agreement. 
2.  The requesting Party shall deliver the request to the other Parties, and shall set out the reasons for 
the request, including identification of the actual or proposed measure or other matter at issue and an 
indication of the legal basis for the complaint. 
3.  A Party that considers it has a substantial trade interest in the matter may participate in the 
consultations on delivery of written notice to the other Parties within seven days of the date of delivery 
of the request for consultations.  The Party shall include in its notice an explanation of its substantial 
trade interest in the matter. 
4.  Consultations on matters regarding perishable goods shall commence within 15 days of the date of 
delivery of the request. 
5.  The consulting Parties shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any 
matter through consultations under this Article or other consultative provisions of this Agreement.  To 
this end, the consulting Parties shall: 
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provision of information 116 under the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), did not amount to the exercise of diplomatic protection by a CAFTA Party, 
even if both dealt with the precise subject-matter of a pending investment 
arbitration.117 
Thus, if the submissions upon which an application is brought to the Court are 
not framed according to the claim subject of the pending arbitral dispute to the Court, 
it might be possible, in theory, that the prohibition in Article 27(1) of the ICSID 
Convention would not be triggered and resort may be had to the Court through Article 
64 of the ICSID Convention. One example would be for a State to allege that the 
injurious acts of another State during the intervening period between the filing of a 
request for arbitration and constitution of the arbitral tribunal are of such an 
extraordinary nature, that they breach the general international law principle of good 
faith118 in the performance of treaty obligations (specifically the underlying obligation 
to comply with procedures contained in the ICSID Convention), by subverting, 
frustrating, or possibly mooting the object of the arbitration dispute altogether.  It may 
be urgent and necessary to seek provisional measures against a recalcitrant respondent 
State, for example, which acts destructively against the subject-matter of a dispute,119 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(a) provide sufficient information to enable a full examination of how the actual or proposed measure 
or other matter might affect the operation and application of this Agreement; and 
(b) treat any confidential information exchanged in the course of consultations on the same basis as the 
Party providing the information. 
6.  In consultations under this Article, a consulting Party may request another consulting Party to make 
available personnel of its government agencies or other regulatory bodies who have expertise in the 
matter subject to consultations.” 
116 Central American Free Trade Agreement, Article 18.3 (Notification and Provision of Information): 
“1.  To the maximum extent possible, each Party shall notify any other Party with an interest in the 
matter of any proposed or actual measure that the Party considers might materially affect the operation 
of this Agreement or otherwise substantially affect that other Party’s interests under this Agreement. 
2.  On request of another Party, a Party shall promptly provide information and respond to questions 
pertaining to any actual or proposed measure, whether or not that other Party has been previously 
notified of that measure. 
3.  Any notification or information provided under this Article shall be without prejudice as to whether 
the measure is consistent with this Agreement.” 
117 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, June 1, 2012, para. 4.87. 
118 On the related uses of the good faith principle in the initiation of an arbitration, see Eric de 
Brabandere, ‘Good Faith’, ‘Abuse of Process’, and the Initiation of Investment Treaty Claims, Journal 
of International Dispute Settlement (2012). 
119 The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has specifically ordered provisional 
measures pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal due to ongoing environmental harms to the 
subject-matter of the dispute in The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. 
Japan), 1999 ITLOS Case Nos. 3, 4, Provisional Measures (August 27, 1999) [hereinafter Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Cases], available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=3&lang=en 
(visited September 20, 2012); and The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), 2001 ITLOS 
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or moves evidence material to the arbitration or assets subject of the arbitration 
request during this period when the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted.120  
In this narrow and extremely exceptional situation, there may be basis for a State to 
submit an application with a request for provisional measures to the Court, alleging 
the recalcitrant State’s fundamental breach of its overriding obligation to abide by and 
comply with the consent to the exclusive remedy of arbitration prescribed under the 
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention.   
The breach alleged against the recalcitrant State should be careful not to refer 
to, or involve, the merits of the dispute submitted to the arbitration, but rather, limit 
itself to the State’s acts that extraordinarily undermine and thwart the exclusive 
remedy required under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention.121  Possible items of 
relief to be prayed for in this theoretical situation would be, first, a declaratory finding 
that a State is in breach of the good faith duty to submit to the dispute resolution 
process contained in the ICSID Convention (to which the State party consented 
without reservation or qualification);122 and second, injunctive relief to stop the State 
from committing further acts that jeopardize the arbitration during the period pending 
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  Precisely for the reason that it would treat the 
breach as a matter of international responsibility, the Court might prove more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Case No. 10, Order (December 3, 2001) [hereinafter MOX Plant Case], available at 
http://www.itlos.org/case_ documents/2001/document_en_197.pdf (visited September 20, 2012).  See 
also Bernard H. Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 American 
Journal of International Law 277 (2001). 
120 See Doak Bishop, Craig Miles, and Roberto Aguirre Luzi, Interim Measures Pending Arbitration, 6 
Latin Lawyer 4, available at http://www.kslaw.com/library/publication/LatinLawyer-
InterimMeasures.pdf (visited September 20, 2012); Stephen M. Ferguson, Interim Measures of 
Protection in International Commercial Arbitration: Problems, Proposed Solutions, and Anticipated 
Results, 12 Currents: International Trade Law Journal 55 (2003). 
121 See Perenco Ecuador Ltd v. Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), 
Decision on Provisional Measures, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, May 8, 2009, para. 61 (where the 
tribunal found that “[t]he claims which the Respondents are invoking the legal process of the domestic 
courts to enforce are the claims which Perenco has brought this arbitration to challenge.  It is, in the 
Tribunal’s opinion, inescapable that the Respondents’ resort to that process violates Article 26.  It is 
also, in the Tribunal’s opinion, inescapable that Perenco would violate the Article if it were, in the 
domestic courts of Ecuador, to advance the arguments which it will rely on in this arbitration to 
challenge the recoverability of payments demanded under Law 42.  Unless and until the Tribunal rules 
that it has no jurisdiction to entertain this dispute, if its jurisdiction is hereafter challenged, or the 
Tribunal delivers a final award on the merits, none of the parties may resort to the domestic courts of 
Ecuador to enforce or resist any claim or right which forms part of the subject matter of this 
arbitration.” 
122 See Ambatielos case (merits: obligation to arbitrate), Judgment of May 19th, 1953, I.C.J. Reports 
1953, at 10, 19:  “…[i]t is well-established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be 
compelled to submit its disputes… either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific 
settlement.”  (Italics added.) 
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effective than national courts of the recalcitrant State, in ordering that State from 
desisting from further acts that undermine, thwart, and frustrate the ICSID arbitration. 
Alleging the recalcitrant State’s breaches of fundamental duties to observe 
good faith in performing obligations under the ICSID Convention and respecting the 
dispute resolution system contained therein, an applicant State may, in theory, 
possibly submit a request to the Court for the indication of provisional measures 




1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that 
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 
 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall 
forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council.”123 
 
It is important to emphasize the urgency of the requested provisional measures 
during the intervening period before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  While 
the element of “urgency” does not specifically appear in the text of Article 41 above, 
the Court has long recognized this element:  
“[t]he formal introduction of urgency into the law of provisional 
measures was made by the Judges of the International Court of 
Justice…They have always examined the circumstances in which the 
request was made to find whether the urgency of the matter justified the 
ordering of provisional measures.  Urgency is also implicit in the 
requirement that in the circumstances immediate action is necessary to 
protect the rights being claimed (of both parties), something that cannot 
wait until the final decision in the case.  The state of the proceedings when 
the request is made, and the estimated period likely to elapse before the 
decision of the court or tribunal on the principal claim, is thus also an 
element relevant to the determination of the urgency of the matter.  In this 
connection, urgency has become linked to the gravity of the harm sought 
to be avoided by a provisional measure.  Only if the Court finds that the 
potential damage will be irreparable, will urgency come to the 
forefront.”124   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 41. 
124 SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 135 (Oxford University 
Press 2005). [hereafter, “ROSENNE 2005”]  For the history of “urgency” as a procedural matter in the 
Rules of the Permanent Court of International Justice up to the present Articles 73, 74(2), and 54(2), of 
the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice, see pp. 136-137. 
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Urgency must be deemed to appear “in two forms and with two meanings.  
Urgency is a matter of procedure, relevant to the convening of the Court or Tribunal 
if not in session when the request is made.  Urgency is a matter of substance among 
the circumstances justifying provisional measures.”125  The Court’s internal rules of 
procedure allow for considerable flexibility to accommodate and adjust to requests 
for provisional measures.  Such requests are expressly given “priority over all other 
cases”, 126  and the Court can itself organize and expedite the time-limits for 
submission of written observations in consideration of the urgency of the dispute,127 
as well as to convene immediately for the purpose of proceeding to a decision on the 
request for provisional measures.128  Under Article 75(1) of its Rules of Court, the 
Court “may at any time decide to examine proprio motu whether the circumstances 
of the case require the indication of provisional measures which ought to be taken or 
complied with by any or all of the parties.”129  After the Court issues an order 
indicating provisional measures, the same is communicated to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council.130   
Thus, in the Anglo-Iranian case,131 a case involving sequestration and seizure of 
the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, in Iran, the Court accepted the 
claim of diplomatic protection by the United Kingdom (the State of the nationality of 
the investor corporation) granted provisional measures despite the refusal of the Iran 
to participate in the proceedings.  Specifically, the Court noted that there was a 
breach of the duty not to deny justice when Iran refused to submit to arbitration under 
its dispute settlement provisions in its concession agreement with the Anglo-Iranian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Id., at 136. 
126 Article 74(1) of the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice. 
127 Articles 74(3) and 74(4) of the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice: 
“3. The Court, or the President if the Court is not sitting, shall fix a date for a hearing which will afford 
the parties an opportunity of being represented at it.  The Court shall receive and take into account any 
observations that may be presented to it before the closure of the oral proceedings. 
4. Pending the meeting of the Court, the President may call upon the parties to act in such a way as will 
enable any order the Court may make on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate 
effects.” 
128 Article 74(2) of the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice: “The Court, if it is not 
sitting when the request is made, shall be convened forthwith for the purpose of proceeding to a 
decision on the request as a matter of urgency.” 
129 Article 75(1) of the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice.  Italics added. 
130 Article 77 of the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice. 
131 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, Order of July 5th, 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, at 89 
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Oil Company: “a violation of international law by breach of the agreement for a 
concession of April 29th, 1933, and by a denial of justice which, according to the 
Government of the United Kingdom, would follow from the refusal of the Iranian 
Government to accept arbitration in accordance with that agreement.”132  As such, 
the Court declared it was well within its powers to issue provisional measures 
proprio motu or without the participation of the respondent State where “the existing 
state of affairs” 133  justifies such issuance: “the object of interim measures of 
protection provided for in the Statute is to preserve the respective rights of the Parties 
pending the decision of the Court, and whereas from the general terms of Article 41 
of the Statute and from the power recognized by Article 61, paragraph 6, of the Rules 
of Court, to indicate interim measures of protection proprio motu, it follows that the 
Court must be concerned to preserve by such measures the rights which may be 
subsequently adjudged by the Court to belong either to the Applicant or to the 
Respondent.”134   
The Court has also shown that it is capable of indicating provisional measures 
without need of making definitive findings of fact on the main dispute subject of a 
State’s Application.135  In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua,136 the Court granted provisional measures but stressed that 
while “the Court has available to it considerable information concerning the facts of 
the present case, including official statements of United States authorities…the 
Court, in the context of the present proceedings on a request for provisional 
measures, has in accordance with Article 41 of the Statute to consider the 
circumstances drawn to its attention as requiring the indication of provisional 
measures, but cannot make definitive findings of fact, and the right of the respondent 
State to dispute the facts alleged and to submit arguments in respect of the merits 
remain unaffected by the Court’s decision.”137  Furthermore, in Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Id. at 92-93. 
133 Id. at 93. 
134 Id. at 93. 
135 See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 
March 15, 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, at 13, paras. 45 and 48. 
136 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of May 10, 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, at 169. 
137 Id. at para. 31.   
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(Georgia v. Russian Federation),138 the Court granted the request for provisional 
measures, despite the pendency of the question of jurisdiction. 
Applying the foregoing, it is not entirely impossible to bring a request for 
provisional measures to the Court in the intervening period from the filing of the 
request before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  Where the Application is 
framed in a manner that merely alleges the breach of the duty to respect the exclusive 
remedy and dispute resolution system contained in the ICSID Convention, it may be 
possible for a State to avoid triggering the prohibition under Article 27(1) of the 
ICSID Convention, and thus submit a request the indication of provisional measures 
under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, limited only to enjoining a recalcitrant 
State’s injurious acts designed to frustrate, thwart, undermine, or subvert the ICSID 
arbitration.  Most importantly, the State acts that are subject of the request for 
indication of provisional measures must be of such an extraordinarily injurious nature 
that the Applicant-State cannot await interim relief to be conferred well after the 
requisite 90 days within which the arbitral tribunal ought to be constituted (and when 
the tribunal itself can thereafter order provisional measures).  Otherwise, it may be 
more expedient and less costly for the claimant to simply file a request for 
provisional measures alongside its request for arbitration, and then wait until the 
arbitral tribunal’s eventual action on the request for provisional measures. 
 
B. Parallel Domestic Actions intended to thwart, frustrate, or undermine the 
ICSID Arbitration 
When foreign investments are involved, there is always a risk of parallel 
proceedings being initiated in domestic courts and before arbitral tribunals.139   As 
observed by two scholars: 
 
“Investor-to-State arbitrations offer examples of Parallel 
Proceedings in which the responsibility of the State may be at stake with 
regard to the same facts, including the same state measures. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138  Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of October 15, 2008, 
I.C.J. Reports 2008, at 353, paras. 74-77. 
139  See Bernardo M. Cremades and Ignacio Madalena, Parallel Proceedings in International 
Arbitration, unpublished paper, 2, available at http://www.luzmenu.com/cremades/Noticias/97/97.pdf 
(visited September 20, 2012). 
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proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs” hereinafter)– has 
increased the complexity of the different methods of dispute resolution in 
the international arena, including the number of forums in which 
individuals and private corporations may claim the responsibility of host 
States... 
 
In addition, foreign investment often entails contracts between 
investors and State entities, which may adopt the form of a concession 
agreement or a public works contract. These contracts establish rights and 
obligations for the parties, in addition to the treaty-based rights addressed 
in the applicable BIT; and may further provide a dispute resolution clause 
allowing the parties to submit any contract claim to court adjudication or 
to arbitration. Therefore, the ultimate forum in which the dispute with the 
State will be resolved may depend on the investor’s choice. 
 
The investor may either exercise the rights derived from the 
contract and start arbitration proceedings in accordance with the contract’s 
arbitration clause, or may activate the procedural right that the applicable 
BIT confers upon the investor against the host State. In the former 
situation, the contract-related dispute will be decided in accordance with 
the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. In the latter case, the 
investment dispute will be decided in accordance with the substantive 
standards of the applicable BIT. The difference between treaty claims and 
pure contract claims can be problematic, as evidenced by the recent case 
law of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). As contract and treaty rights can easily be intertwined, investors 
may attempt to exercise both simultaneously, giving rise to an 
unquestionable risk of duplicate proceedings..” 
 
Under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, Contracting States are obligated 
to observe and respect the exclusive remedy of ICSID arbitration.  While the 
principle of exhaustion of local remedies is not required in this provision,140 “a 
Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial 
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention.”141  The 
risk of parallel domestic proceedings alongside a pending ICSID arbitration is not 
merely theoretical,142 as several ICSID arbitral tribunals have already had to issue 
provisional measures against respondent States to discontinue actions in domestic 
courts.143 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 See Christoph Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren:  The Return of Local Remedies in Investment 
Arbitration, 4, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1, 16  (2005). 
141 ICSID Convention, Article 26, second sentence. 
142 See Robin F. Hansen, Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Treaty Arbitration:  Responses for 
Treaty Drafters, Arbitrators, and Parties, 73(4) Modern Law Review 523-550 (July 2010). 
143 See ICSID Commentary, at 786-793, referring to CSOB v. Slovakia, Procedural Order No. 4, 
January 11, 1999; SGS v. Pakistan, Procedural Order No. 2, October 16, 2008, at 394-396; Zhinvali v. 
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When a State deliberately initiates, continues, and refuses to suspend a domestic 
action directly involving a dispute already subject of a pending ICSID arbitration 
(despite an order from an arbitral tribunal to that effect), there is basis to allege its 
breach of the good faith duty of a Contracting State to observe exclusivity of 
remedies under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention.144  This breach engages the 
international responsibility of the State, and may be brought to the International 
Court of Justice under Article 64 of the ICSID Convention.  In this situation, the 
Court does not adjudicate on the merits of the dispute already pending before the 
ICSID arbitral tribunal, but rather examines the international responsibility of a 
recalcitrant State that acts in bad faith to use parallel domestic proceedings to avoid 
complying with the exclusive arbitral remedy mandated under the ICSID 
Convention.  Where a State deliberately uses domestic actions to allegedly justify 
obstructions to, non-compliance with, or defiance of, the ICSID arbitral proceedings 
and the orders, the State of the claimant should be permitted to seek recourse to the 
Court through Article 64 of the ICSID Convention.  The dispute that is referred to the 
Court is the recalcitrant State’s breach of its duties to perform its obligations under 
the ICSID Convention (specifically Article 26 therein) and to act in good faith to 
abide by the orders of the arbitral tribunal seised of the dispute.  This duty to act in 
good faith is read into the ICSID Convention, as acknowledged by the arbitral 
tribunal in Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic:145 
“107.  The principle of good faith has long been recognized in public 
international law, as it is also in all national legal systems.  This principle 
requires parties ‘to deal honestly and fairly with each other, to represent 
their motives and purposes truthfully, and to refrain from taking unfair 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Georgia, Award, January 24, 2003, para. 45; Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, Order No. 1, July 1, 2003, 
para. 1; MINE v. Guinea, Decision on Provisional Measures of 4 December 1985, unreported but cited 
in ICSID Commentary, at 786: 
“(1) The Tribunal recommends that MINE immediately withdraw and permanently discontinue all 
pending litigation in national courts, and commence no new action, arising out of the dispute.  
Litigation based upon the award of the American Arbitration Association is considered to arise out of 
this dispute for purposes of this Provisional Measure. 
(2) The Tribunal further recommends that MINE dissolve every existing provisional measure in 
litigation in national courts (including attachment, garnishment, sequestration, or seizure of the 
property of Guinea, by whatever term designated and by whatever means performed) and seek no new 
provisional remedy in a national court.” 
Note as well that in Roussalis v. Romania, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, December 7, 2011, 
para. 255, the arbitral tribunal accepted that the suspension of pending parallel litigation in Romanian 
courts was sufficient to moot the alleged breach of Article 26 of the ICSID Convention. 
144 See Perenco Ecuador Ltd v. Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), 
Decision on Provisional Measures, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, May 8, 2009, para. 61. 
145 Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, April 9, 2009. 
	   41	  
advantage…’ This principle governs the relations between States, but also 
the legal rights and duties of those seeking to assert an international claim 
under a treaty.  Nobody shall abuse the rights granted by treaties, and more 
generally, every rule of law includes an implied clause that it should not 
be abused… 
108.  The idea that the international conventions granting protection to 
foreign investors through arbitration have to be applied in good faith was 
also underscored by the tribunal in Amco Asia Corporation et al. v. 
Indonesia: 
‘... like any other conventions, a convention to arbitrate is not to be 
construed restrictively, nor, as a matter of fact, broadly or liberally. … 
and this is again a general principle of law – any convention, including 
conventions to arbitrate, should be construed in good faith, that is to 
say by taking into account the consequences of their commitments the 
parties may be considered as having reasonably and legitimately 
envisaged.’ 
109.  The Washington Convention as well as the BIT have to be 
construed with due regard to the international principle of good faith…”146 
 
The actual subject-matter of the dispute pending before the arbitral tribunal will 
thus not form part of the dispute referred to the Court under Article 64 of the ICSID 
Convention.  What would be at issue before the Court is the recalcitrant State’s 
refusal to follow the dispute resolution system under the ICSID Convention by 
interposing domestic litigation before its national courts.  As such, this proposal 
should not run afoul of the prohibition on diplomatic protection under Article 27(1) 
of the ICSID Convention, since the dispute brought to the Court is not, stricto sensu, 
“an international claim in respect of a dispute” submitted to the arbitral tribunal.  The 
Court’s jurisdiction would only be invoked in support of the arbitration, and mainly 
to ensure that the recalcitrant State applies and complies with, its obligations under 
the ICSID Convention.   
 
C. Post-award Conservatory Measures to ensure Recognition and Enforcement 
of the Arbitral Award 
While Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention makes it obligatory for each 
Contracting State to “recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Id. at paras 107-109. 
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binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its 
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State”,147 the Convention is 
silent on how this obligation will be practically implemented.  An arbitral tribunal 
that has already issued its award is no longer in a position to issue provisional 
measures, and for all intents and purposes, the enforcement of the award would 
devolve upon the Contracting States themselves pursuant to their obligations under 
Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention.  While Article 64 of the ICSID Convention is 
widely understood to enable referrals to the Court on matters involving the 
recognition and enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards, the scope of the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction over such matters has not been fully fleshed out. 
I submit that the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae under Article 64 of the 
ICSID Convention would adequately support its authority to issue post-award 
conservatory measures, which are intended to ensure that State obligations to 
recognize and enforce Convention awards would not be breached.  This power to 
grant post-award conservatory measures would be analogous to the authority of 
national courts to issue post-award conservatory measures.  
It may be recalled that the 1958 New York Convention and the 1971 Hague 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters both appear silent on the issue of post-award conservatory 
measures.  However, a commentator has observed that no municipal court in any 
state party to the [New York] Convention “has [ever] doubted that an attachment in 
connection with the enforcement of an arbitral award, in order to secure payment 
under the award, is compatible with the Convention.”148  The ICC Rules provide for 
conservatory and interim measures in Article 23, which indicates the authority of the 
ICC arbitral tribunal to issue provisional orders for pre-award attachments.  The 
classic rationale for Article 23 is to preserve the rights of a party pending final 
resolution of a dispute. 149   The issue of interim relief pending recognition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 ICSID Convention, Article 54(1). 
148  ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, COMMENTARY VOLUME IX, 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 364 
(1984).  See also Andrew S. Holmes (Student Note), Pre-Award Attachment under the UN Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 Va. J. Int’l L. 785, 801 (1981), 
which argued that pre-award attachment was unnecessary because the New York Convention already 
allows for post-award attachment to satisfy arbitral awards. 
149  See Neil Kaplan, Interim Measures – A Practical Experience, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 2006:  BACK TO BASICS? 768-775 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg (ed.),Kluwer Law 
	   43	  
proceedings thus appears to be a matter governed by domestic procedures, and 
entrusted to the competence of national courts.150  Quite similar to Article 54(1) of 
the ICSID Convention, the Article 28(6) of the ICC Rules stipulates: “the parties 
undertake to carry out any Award without delay and shall be deemed to have waived 
their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.”  
Applying the foregoing, where a State alleges breaches of duties by another 
Contracting State under Article 54(1) to the ICSID Convention, and is further able to 
show that the ability of said Contracting State to recognize and enforce a Convention 
award is diminished due to acts taken to isolate the assets of such Contracting State 
from enforcement, the State may refer these separate breaches to the International 
Court of Justice as a legal dispute covered by Article 64 of the ICSID Convention.  
The State may likewise apply for provisional measures pursuant to Article 41 of the 
Statute of the Court, in order to ensure that recognition and enforcement of the 
Convention award will not be rendered nugatory by the acts of the recalcitrant State.  
In this instance, there is clearly no violation of the prohibition against diplomatic 
protection under Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention, since the dispute falls under 
the carve-out exception or proviso on matters that involve a State’s refusal to comply 
or abide with awards issued under the Convention. 
 
IV.  Conclusion:  Cooperation Between Court and Arbitral 
Tribunal 
The creation of the dispute resolution system under the ICSID Convention 
was not intended to antagonize or undermine the established and authoritative system 
of adjudication under the International Court of Justice.  By providing for a clause 
compromissoire under Article 64 of the ICSID Convention, the drafters of the 
Convention ultimately foresaw the need for the Court’s jurisdiction in certain areas 
that could not be addressed even within the “self-contained” arbitration system. Even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
International, 2007).  For a copious survey of country and institution practices on interim measures, 
see AXEL BÖSCH (ED.), PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1994). 
150  MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW AND 
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if Contracting States to the Convention are uniformly bound to recognize and enforce 
arbitral awards, the mode and manner of enforcement was not institutionally 
prescribed in the ICSID Convention. 
Why, then, would the Court be any more suitable to exercise its jurisdiction 
ultimately to aid the uninterrupted conduct of the arbitral process and bring 
Contracting States in line with their obligations to recognize and enforce awards 
under the ICSID Convention?  The Court does not have its own enforcement 
machinery, and certainly does not possess its own police force capable of exacting 
compliance with its decisions.151  National courts at least have the benefit of direct 
vertical linkage with executive branches that can enforce judicial writs, orders, and 
judgments.  The Court, on the other hand, depends more on a horizontal relationship 
with the United Nations Security Council for the enforcement of its decisions. Article 
94(1) of the United Nations Charter provides that “[e]ach Member of the United 
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice 
to which it is a party”, while Article 94(2) of the same Charter states the 
consequences of non-compliance with the decisions of the Court:  “[i]f any party to a 
case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by 
the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it 
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to 
give effect to the judgment.”152  And if the Security Council does not muster the 
required votes to make such decisions, then a State seeking to enforce a judgment of 
the Court “could take non-forcible measures such as reprisals, for example, by 
seizing the assets of the defaulting State within its jurisdiction.  It could try to gain 
the co-operation of a third State by asking it to use its own power to deprive the 
defaulting State of certain rights…” 153  Clearly, enforcement of international 
decisions remains a matter for both law and politics. 
However, the same may be said of the entire international investment dispute 
settlement system altogether, which, as shown in the Introduction, had its early and 
rather uneasy beginnings in the Court itself.  The difficulties of enforcement do not 
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easily translate into clear empirical disincentives against compliance with 
international decisions. 154  Despite perceived difficulties of enforcement of 
international decisions, States continue to avail of ICSID arbitration procedures, and 
States likewise continue to refer international disputes involving issues of State 
responsibility to the International Court of Justice.  Clearly, there is value in the legal 
settlement of a dispute in and of itself, independently of the question of its coercive 
enforceability in the political sphere of international relations. 
My narrow purpose to this article was to explore theoretical possibilities 
behind the underutilized Article 64 of the ICSID Convention, particularly in regard 
to recalcitrant States that seek to undermine the Convention and thwart the “self-
contained” dispute resolution system therein. As this article has shown, the clause 
compromissoire of Article 64 in the ICSID Convention can function as a pragmatic 
tool for cooperation between the Court and ICSID arbitral tribunals, perhaps more 
than we would ordinarily realize from the caution expressed in the Report of the 
Executive Directors on the ICSID Convention against possible disruptions to the 
arbitral proceedings.  Much as the drafters of the ICSID Convention desired to 
anticipate every possible contingency and make the system as “self-contained” as 
possible within the ICSID arbitration procedure, as I showed in Part II, there are 
lacunae for which the judicious exercise of the Court’s judicial function may well be 
more appropriate and strategically beneficial to invoke.  If national courts are 
harnessed to lend support to international arbitrations, it defies comprehension that 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction provided for in the specific clause 
compromissoire in the ICSID Convention was meant to rule out the Court’s support 
for ICSID arbitration. In an era where recalcitrant States are lately emerging to 
disavow their obligations to comply with the ICSID Convention, 155  it strains 
credulity that the Court would be deprived of the jurisdiction to determine 
international responsibility for material breaches of, and serious non-compliance 
with, the provisions of the ICSID Convention.  Not only would it be to the advantage 
of parties as well as ICSID arbitral tribunals to have the additional force of the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction over questions of international responsibility arising 	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from non-compliance with the ICSID Convention, but it is to the advantage of the 
international investment dispute settlement system as a whole to give real meaning to 
Article 64 of the ICSID Convention as the mechanism that bridges institutionally 
managed cooperation between tribunals and the Court. By purposely re-examining 
and appropriately including the Court in matters appropriate to support the chosen 
remedy of ICSID arbitration and to ensure overall compliance with the ICSID 
Convention, one can indeed say that the international investment dispute settlement 
system under the ICSID Convention was genuinely designed to be “self-contained”. 
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